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TAX POOLING AND TAX POSTPONEMENT-THE
CAPITAL EXCHANGE FUNDS
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEINt
AN individual who owns a sizable block of stock in a public corpora-
tion, and who has had the pleasure of watching that stock appreciate
in value over a period of years, frequently feels a need to diversify his
holdings. The decision to diversify would normally involve a sale of
the appreciated stock for cash and a reinvestment of the proceeds.
However, a sale for cash will occasion the imposition of a capital gains
tax equal at the maximum to 25%o of the gain realized,' whereas no
tax is imposed if the securities are simply retained. Since there is thus
a difference in tax cost between selling and retaining an appreciated
asset, the investor wishing to diversify is obliged to take the tax penalty
into account and to consider whether the benefits of diversification
are really worth a substantial reduction in his personal wealth. The
question is presumably a difficult one, and the investor's reluctance to
suffer an immediate and highly visible impairment of capital may ulti-
mately lead to the abandonment of what otherwise would commend
itself as a sound personal investment goal.2
The so-called capital exchange fund3 is a response and perhaps a
solution to the familiar dilemma of the successful investor who is
locked-in to existing investments by the threatened imposition of the
gains tax. Capital exchange funds are mutual funds4 formed through
t Professor of Law, Rutgers University; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1201(b) [hereinafter cited as IRC].
2. See Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAxEs 247 (1957);
Holt & Shelton, The Lock-in Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 337 (196I2).
S. Capital exchange funds are also known as swap funds, deposit funds, diversification
funds, tax-free exchange funds, and Centennial funds. The last denomination is in honor
of the pioneer organization in the field.
4. The term "mutual fund" refers to an open-end diversified management investment
company which is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. In contrast to
dosed-end investment companies, which have a stable capital structure, mutual funds
stand ready at all times to redeem outstanding shares and in most cases are also engaged
in a continuous offering of new shares to the public. Mutual fund shares are redeemed
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the acquisition of securities from large numbers of individual investors
solely in exchange for shares of the fund. Although the securities ex-
changed have substantially appreciated in value in the hands of the
individual investors, the exchange is claimed to be non-taxable to the
investors owing to the presumed applicability of Internal Revenue
Code section 351, which provides that gain or loss shall not be recog-
nized if property [the appreciated securities] is transferred to a cor-
poration [the fund] by one or more persons [the investors] solely in
exchange for the corporation's stock or securities [shares of the fund],
and such person or persons are in control of the corporation im-
mediately after the exchange. Since an ordinary sale of appreciated
securities is a taxable event,5 this claim to tax-free treatment under
section 351 has considerable significance from the investor's standpoint.
If it is valid, a technique has been discovered by which an individual
stock owner can convert an existing and appreciated investment com-
mitment, uneasily represented by a substantial position in one or a
small number of securities, into "investment company shares repre-
senting an interest in a diversified portfolio of comparable quality,
having sound investment management, without the realization of gain
or loss for federal income tax purposes."0
It is to be noted that the result thus achieved is not otherwise ob-
tainable under the Code's like-kind exchange provisions-which permit
real estate and other tangible business or investment property to be
exchanged for similar property without tax-since these provisions
expressly exclude trades in securities.7 Moreover, while the tax-free
reorganization sections confer a somewhat similar set of benefits in cases
involving the acquisition by a publicly-held company of the assets or
stock of a smaller closely-held concern,8 the latter transaction normally
and sold at prices that relate to "net asset value"-which is determined on a per share
basis by taking the market value of the securities in the fund's portfolio, adding the
value of other assets and subtracting liabilities, and dividing the result by the number
of shares oustanding. See Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. Rav.
181 (1961).
As indicated below, capital exchange funds, though open to share redemptions and
hence technically open-end funds, do not engage in continuous public offerings of new
shares. See note 45 infra.
5. Prior to the predecessor of present section 351, a transfer of property to a corpora-
tion in exchange for all of its stock was regarded as a sale, and gain or loss was recognized
to the transferor or transferors. Napoleon B. Burge, 4 B.T.A. 732 (1926). Since 1921, when
the predecessor section was enacted, no gain or loss has been recognized on such trans-
actions.
6. Prospectus of Centennial Management And Research Corporation 3 (Dec. 23, 1960).
7. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
8. I.R.C. §§ 368, 861 and 354. And see Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71
HARv. L. Rav. 254, 257 (1957).
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involves the sale of an operating business and is likely to be a once-in-a-
lifetime occurrence from the standpoint of the seller. In contrast, the
capital exchange fund phenomenon may involve the disposition of secu-
rities acquired purely for speculation and can occur as often as the indi-
vidual is fortunate enough to find himself with substantially appreci-
ated securities on hand and there are new funds available for exchange
purposes. Indeed, the opportunity to acquire fund shares now also
sometimes serves as the capstone of a prior reorganization exchange
since it allows the former owner of the closely-held corporation to com-
plete the tax-free transition from entrepreneur to investor status by
obtaining, in exchange for the stock of the acquiring corporation, a
fractional interest in a more or less balanced portfolio of high-grade
issues.9
Exchange funds are, of course, an accidental development-that
is, an accident of skillful planning-and not the product of a conscious
legislative determination to extend relief to investors "who feel pre-
vented from diversifying because of what they consider to be the ex-
cessive tax cost of selling appreciated assets."'10 As a self-help technique,
and one that has a strong flavor of "unintended benefit," the fund
arrangement reportedly has been subjected to an intensive, though
evidently inconclusive, analysis by the Internal Revenue Service."1
The Service, having initially issued a few favorable rulings on fund
formations, subsequently changed its mind (by half) and announced
that it would no longer issue any formal rulings with respect to such
transactions, either favorable or unfavorable.'- However, legal opinions
have been secured to the effect that section 351 is applicable and these
are referred to in the fund prospectuses under the heading "Federal
9. In addition to those who desire to avoid the tax cost of selling low-basis securities
for cash, the exchange funds may be of use to persons owning stock the sale of which is
restricted by SEC regulations, to corporate employees holding stock acquired through the
exercise of employee stock options, or to the officers of a corporation when "it wouldn't
look right for them to be selling the stock of the corporation in which they are corporate
officers... Bierman et al., Substance vs. Form in Corporate Activities: A Series of Panel
Discussions, N.Y.U. 20TH INsT. ON F D. TAX 975, 995 (1962).
10. Prospectus of Centennial Management And Research Corporation 3 (Dec. 23, 1960).
11. See Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement
of Principles, N.Y.U. 20r INsr. ON Fa. TAx 1, 24 (1962); Bierman et al., supra note 9. at
995-96.
12. TJ.R. 303 (Feb. 9, 1961). At about the same time the Service announced that it
would issue no rulings with respect to promoter-solicited transfers of appreciated real
estate to a newly formed real estate investment trust in exchange for shares or interests
in such a trust. T.I.R. 312 (March 13, 1961). And see Rev. Proc. 63-20, 1963-2 C.B. 754,
stating that the no-rulings policy would apply equally to transfers of securities to funds
organized as partnerships or trusts.
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Tax Status,"' although the Service's refusal to rule on fund formations
is not there disclosed. It is not entirely clear whether the no-rulings
policy simply reflects the closeness of the legal issues raised by the ex-
change fund arrangement, or is intended to have a deterrent effect on
fund promoters and their counsel. 14 If the latter, however, it has mis-
carried. While the Service will not rule on proposed fund formations
at present, the more important fact is that it has not attacked in the
case of funds completed without a ruling, so that at least in public
contemplation the official attitude towards exchange funds appears as
one of tolerance or resignation. 5
But the matter is too important to be resolved by silence and one
suspects that the Service may presently feel obliged to begin again to
issue favorable rulings on Centennial-type fund formations.' 0 Before
this occurs, if it does at all, and in any event because the exchange
fund device appears to have found a regular place in the tax-planner's
tool box,' 7 a consideration of the issues seems appropriate.
13. E.g., Prospectus of Second Congress Street Fund, Inc. 4 (Jan. 16, 1964).
14. See Goldman, Warwick Fund ruling withdrawn; IRS policy questioned, 19 J. TAx-
ATION 197, 198 (1963), criticizing the Service's no-rulings policy on the ground that "the
official purpose in not issuing rulings was, apparently, not based upon any belief that the
exchange is taxable; no ruling has ever been issued nor any cogent thesis offered to that
effect, so far as is known. On the contrary, the Service, banking on the investor's fear to
act without the protection of a ruling, simply denied that protection."
15. Following the issuance in 1961 of T.I.R. 303 (Feb. 9, 1961) note 12 supra, some
commentators were of the view that the Service's refusal to rule on exchange fund forma-
tions had "pretty much killed the idea." Bierman et al., supra, note 9, at 997; IsmAELs
et al., S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERaS 102 (1962). Reports of death proved
premature, however, as fund prospectuses again began to appear in number towards the
end of 1962. Though unblessed by ruling, the newer funds were able to furnish unquali-
fiedly favorable opinions of counsel and had little difficulty in most instances in attracting
investor interest on that basis. The only event of a public nature that seems to have
occurred in the interim-that is, between the time the idea appeared dead and the time
it revived with a rush-was the publication of an unofficial but widely circulated speech
by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue in which, in the course of a general
description of Service rulings policy, the Commissioner remarked that the refusal to rule
in certain "close" situations, presumably including exchange fund formations, should not
be taken to mean that the Service was "necessarily . . . hostile . . . towards the transac-
tion," but only that it did not wish expressly to approve of it. Caplin, supra, note 11, at
15; and see Caplin, A Status Report From the Commissioner, 14 THE TAX ExEcuTivE 9, 18
(1961). These remarks, together with the Service's failure to attack the first fund formed
without a ruling, evidently provided assurance for most investors and their counsel that
there was nothing really to be feared. See Note, Explanation of Commissioner's Comments
on Centennial Funds, 16 J. TAXATION 62 (1962).
16. Precisely this appears to have occurred in the related area of personal holding
company mergers. See note 76 infra.
17. See Feder, Relieving the Impact of the Revenue Act of 1964 on "New" Personal
Holding Companies, N.Y.U. 23D INsT. ON FED. TAx 723, 742 (1965).
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CAPITAL EXCHANGE FuNDs: ORGANIZATION AND TAx STATUS
Since speculation concerning the tax status of exchange fund forma-
tions has largely centered upon the formative procedure itself, a brief
description of that procedure is required by way of background.18
An exchange fund is an incorporated entity formed on the basis
of a small cash contribution by the fund promoter or by the investment
management organization which will assume the duties of portfolio
supervision once the fund is underway. The shares of the fund are
offered to the public by means of a prospectus filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and are distributed through securities
dealers at a cost to the purchaser of a sales charge which is scaled down
as the size of the transaction increases. Fund shares are not, of course,
sold to the public for cash. Instead, investors holding appreciated securi-
ties acceptable to the fund manager are invited to deposit those securi-
ties, together with information relating to their tax bases, with a bank
designated as depository pending the completion of the fund. 9
A list of securities deemed acceptable by the fund manager on the
basis of their investment quality is included in the fund's prospectus.
The fund manager, however, retains the right to accept or reject any
security offered for deposit, whether or not it appears on the acceptable
list, and all of the funds contain some securities not so listed. On the
other hand, it is likely that the volume and variety of the non-listed
securities that are offered for deposit is large, and it may be presumed
that a substantial number are rejected by the fund manager as un-
suitable for investment.
Securities accepted for deposit during the solicitation period are not
then exchanged for fund shares but are held by the depository under
an escrow agreement, with all voting and dividend rights remaining
in the depositor. At the end of the solicitation period, which normally
lasts three to four months, deposits are closed and the fund transmits
to the depositors a "preliminary report," which lists all securities then
on deposit with their tax bases and respective market values. The
"preliminary report" permits the depositor to form a judgment con-
cerning the investment merits of the portfolio, and he may (without
cost) withdraw the securities deposited by him on notification to the
18. The procedure adopted is uniform for all the funds, and with minor modifications
follows the pattern set by the Centennial Fund formation.
19. The minimum aggregate value of securities required to be deposited by each in.
vestor is usually $25,000, although the average deposit is apparently often greater. See
note 44 infra.
1965]
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depository at any time within a period of three weeks following receipt
of the report. For a brief additional period, usually one week, the
fund manager may exercise a further right of rejection in order to re-
dress any imbalance in the portfolio resulting from withdrawals based
upon the preliminary report. As a consequence of possible withdrawals
and rejections occurring after the close of the solicitation period, the
securities ultimately exchanged for the shares of the fund may differ
somewhat from those contained in the preliminary report, although the
difference is usually minor.
Unless withdrawals by depositors and rejections by the fund man-
ager reduce the aggregate market value of securities remaining on
deposit below a stated minimum on the day following the close of
the final rejection period, the exchange of shares of the fund for the
deposited securities is consummated on that day without any further
action by the depositors. For purposes of determining how many shares
of the stock of the fund shall be issued in the exchange, the securities
of each investor are valued as of the exchange date with a deduction
for the applicable sales charge.
The exchange funds are technically open-end funds, which means
that the fund shares are redeemable at net asset value at the option
of the holder. At the same time, as indicated below, the funds are
barred from offering new shares to the public once the original offer-
ing has been completed and are thus closed to share purchases for cash
other than through the reinvestment of cash dividends.
Once operative, the fund will proceed to qualify as a "regulated
investment company" under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue
Code by annually distributing to shareholders substantially all of its
net dividend and interest income. 20 It is then treated as a conduit for
income tax purposes and in effect is relieved of liability for corporate
tax. Amounts distributed by the fund out of net investment income
are, of course, taxed to the shareholders as ordinary dividends. Net
long-term capital gains, if distributed currently, are also taxed to the
shareholders, rather than the fund, and at long-term capital gain rates.
If, as is commonly the case, the fund elects to retain instead of dis-
tributing its realized net long-term gains, such gains are taxed to the
fund at a rate of 25 %. The fund, however, may treat the accumulated
capital gains as if constructively distributed to shareholders, in which
event the shareholder is required to include his pro-rata share of such
gains in his own income as long-term capital gain.21 The 257o capital
20. I.R.C. § 851 et seq.
21. I.R.C. § 852(b)(3).
[V/ol. 75:183
EXCHANGE FUNDS
gain tax paid by the company is then treated as having been paid on
the shareholder's behalf, and the latter is entitled to credit his share
of the total tax paid against his individual tax liability. To prevent a
double capital gain tax on the disposition of his fund shares, the share-
holder increases his basis for those shares by 757o of the constructive
distribution. To illustrate, suppose an investment company has net
long-term capital gains for the taxable year of $4 per share. The com-
pany distributes no portion of that gain but designates the entire
amount as a capital gain dividend for the year and pays a tax of $1 per
share on its shareholders' behalf. A shareholder holding fund shares
with a basis of $20 would then include $4 in gross income as long-
term capital gain, credit $1 against his individual tax liability, and
increase the basis of his fund shares to $23.2
The exchange of individually-owned securities for shares of the
fund is, as earlier stated, assumed to be tax free to the individual
transferor under section 351. On this assumption, the basis to the
corporate transferee of the securities acquired on the exchange is the
same as the basis of those securities in the hands of the several trans-
ferors, 23 and the basis of the fund shares received by the individuals
is the same as the basis of the securities exchanged therefor.2 4 Gain is
thus postponed, not forgiven. When shares are redeemed, the share-
holder recognizes a capital gain (or loss) in the amount of the differ-
ence between the cash plus the fair market value of any property
received and the adjusted basis of the shares surrendered.23
It is worth mentioning, finally, that share redemptions as they occur
are normally satisfied by the fund in kind, that is, by distribution of
portfolio securities rather than cash to the redeeming shareholder.
Distributions in kind do not result in the recognition of gain by the
fund;26 cash redemptions, on the other hand, would entail a forced
realization of gain by the fund, and would subject the continuing
shareholders to a reduction in the net asset value of their shares equal
to the tax paid. It may be assumed that the securities used to meet
redemption demands are chosen with a view to improving the quality
22. The exchange fund prospectuses state-somewhat cryptically, as it seems-that
"since there will undoubtedly be considerable variation in the degree of unrealized ap-
predation of the assets of the various investors, the pooling of capital gains tax liability
on assets which the Fund . . . find[s] it advisable to sell at a gain will be of greater
advantage to some investors than to others." E.g., Prospectus of Second Congress Street
Fund, Inc. (Jan. 16, 1964), p. 5.
23. I.R.C. § 362(a).
24. I.R.C. § 358(a).
25. I.R.C. § 1001.
26. i.R.C. § 311(a); Regs. § 1.311-1(a).
1965]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the portfolio and, if consistent therewith, disposing of low-basis
assets. This need involve no disadvantage to the redeeming share-
holder provided that the securities received by him can at once be
converted into cash,27 and in that connection it is understood that some
fund management organizations are now extending guarantees to share-
holders with respect to the cash convertibility at or near net asset value
of any securities distributed to them in redemption of their fund
shares.
28
PROMOTER SoLIcrrATION AND THE "CONTROL" REQUIREMENT
The purported application of section 351 to exchange fund forma-
tion comes as a surprise, initially at least, to those who share a common,
classroom image of the type of transaction that is contemplated by the
section. What is undoubtedly conceived of as typical of section 351
is a relatively small-volume transaction involving either the incorpora-
tion of an existing business by its owners or the establishment of a new
business by a limited number of individuals desiring to combine their
capital and skills.29 By contrast exchange fund formations may involve
upwards of a thousand shareholders, each of whom, in exchange for one
or a few appreciated securities, obtains a fractional interest in a large
diversified portfolio of which his former property is but a small part.
Moreover, these persons are brought together-perhaps "assembled" is
the better term-not by virtue of acquaintance, business contact or
other element of previous association, but as a result of solicitation by
promoters, brokers or fund management companies. Since the fund is
publicly held the investors lack day-to-day control over management
activities and, of course, have no individual management responsibili-
ties. The qualities of group identity and active shareholder participa-
tion that are normally anticipated in section 351 transactions are thus
necessarily absent in the formation of an exchange fund, as of course
they would be in the formation of any public company, at least as
respects the public shareholders.
These elements of departure from the more familiar image of a
small business incorporation prompt at least a suspicion that the sec-
27. A shareholder receiving a distribution of portfolio securities in redemption of his
shares of the fund takes a basis for the securities received equal to their value at time
of distribution, I.R.C. § 1012, so that a prompt resale of the securities results in little or
no further gain or loss. See Brrrax, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORI-OarlONS AND
SHAuiloLDm.s 242 (1959).
28. Reported in Fortune, May, 1965, p. 64.
29. For a discussion of some of the tax and corporate problems incident to the incor-
poration of a small enterprise, see Henvitz, Allocation of Stock Between Scroices and
Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1098 (1962).
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don has been put to an unintended (certainly an unexpected) use. The
suspicion grows stronger by reason of the circumstantial resemblance
between fund formations and what former Commissioner Caplin has
called an ordinary "marketplace exchange of securities."3' 0 Thus the
exchange of individually-owned securities for shares of the fund has
the same anonymous and impersonal quality as an ordinary brokerage
transaction; it is effected through a securities dealer; it involves the
payment of a sales commission; and it eventuates in nothing less than
the exchange of one marketable security for a claim upon others. The
individual investor doubtless has the same sense of having gone
through a sale-and-reinvestment process that he has in a conventional
trading situation and is presumably indifferent (other than from a tax
standpoint) to the omission of a cash step along the way.
In issuing its "no-rulings" release in 1961, the Service took care to
confine and direct itself to transactions involving an exchange of ap-
preciated securities for shares in a newly organized investment com-
pany which occur "as a result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or
investment houses." 3' The technical justification for this position has
never been stated officially, but it is evident from the stress on "solicita-
tion by promoters" that the Service shares the supposition that section
351 is intended to apply to corporate formations by persons who to-
gether have some element of identity or prior association. The dif-
ficulty, no doubt, has been to find anything in the statute that will turn
that supposition into a supportable limitation on the scope of the
section.
It has been reported that the Service initially entertained doubts as
to whether exchange fund formations meet the "control" requirement
of section 351(a).32 Section 351 requires that the persons transferring
property to a corporation be in "control" of it "immediately after the
exchange," "control" being defined as ownership of at least 80% of the
corporation's outstanding shares.33 The 807 requirement may be met
by the transferors as a group even though no single shareholder in the
group owns that percentage, but it is obvious that the several persons
transferring property must be seen to have acted in concert in order
to permit their shares to be aggregated. What evidently matters-at
least where time-relatedness is in doubt-is that the transferors obtain
control of the corporation by virtue of a prearrangement which defines
30. Caplin, supra note 11, at 2,.
31. T.LR. 303 (Feb. 9, 1961).
32. Bierman et al., supra note 9, at 996.
33. IXKC. §§ 351(a) and 368(c).
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their rights as stock or security holders and expresses their intention
to act concertedly.
3 4
When, as in the case of the exchange funds, properties are simul-
taneously exchanged for shares of the corporate transferee by persons
who, as a consequence, obtain more than 80% stock ownership, it is
hard to deny that there has been compliance with the "control" test,
even if it be said that the simultaneity of the exchange reflects no more
than a shared intention to act so as to meet the test itself. What would
have to be shown-and what the Service apparently finds it impossible
to show-is that simultaneity is lacking in substance, though formally
attained. Such a showing would apparently require a determination
that the individual deposits of securities in escrow, which take place
over a period of months and hence at least are non-simultaneous, are
in fact equivalent to an outright exchange of property for fund shares.
In effect, the argument would be that the fund, having been formed
initially by issuance of a few shares to the promoter or fund manage-
ment organization, thereafter simply distributed its stock to the public
in a series of disconnected transactions which are not entitled to be
viewed in the aggregate. Looked at in this way, each depositor (with
the possible exception of the very earliest depositors) could be said to
have exchanged his securities for a non-controlling interest in the fund,
and hence to have made a taxable exchange.35
But this contention, if pressed, would not be difficult to answer. In
the first place, beneficial ownership of the deposited securities remains
in the individual depositors until the exchange date, each depositor
having the right to vote his securities and receive cash dividends, and
each obtaining credit for (or being charged with) any change in the
value of his securities while in the hands of the depository. The Service
has ruled that the ownership of escrowed securities attaches to the
party who possesses the voting and dividend rights, even though that
persons lacks a present right to obtain the property from the es-
crowee.36 The fund depositors, in addition to voting and dividend
rights, retain an absolute right to withdraw their securities from the
depository and are in no way bound to make the exchange until the
end of the withdrawal period. These factors, particularly the with-
drawal right, provide an answer, and probably a complete answer, to
34. Regs. § 1.351-1(a)(1).
35. Regs. § 1.351-1(a)(2), Example 2.
36. Rev. Rul. 55-458, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 579; and see McAbee v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.
1130 (1946) (acq. 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 4).
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any argument that the initial deposit of securities by the investor con-
stitutes a final disposition of those securities. 37
Viewed somewhat less mechanically, it is likely, if not certain, that
each investor would wish to form some judgment with respect to the
investment merits of the fund's portfolio before committing himself
irrevocably to make the exchange. The "preliminary report" gives the
depositor an opportunity to compare his own prospective contribution
with those proposed to be made by others, and he may withdraw if he
determines that the composition of the fund is undesirable. Quite
obviously, the withdrawal period must end simultaneously for all the
depositors, so that the simultaneity of the exchange, far from being a
tax contrivance, can be said to be necessary and unavoidable in the
formation of an exchange fund. To put the same point affirmatively,
if the investor elects to remain in the fund, it is presumably because
he finds the portfolio satisfactory and expects the other depositors, or
most of them, to do likewise. It is true that others may withdraw with-
out his knowledge and that the final portfolio may therefore differ
from that contained in the "preliminary report"; but since a succes-
sion of preliminary reports would be impractical, this is a risk he is
obliged to accept in order to avoid unduly delaying the completion
of the fund. At all events, to find that the several transfers lacked
mutuality or interdependence, one would have to assume that every
investor had been prepared to conclude that any combination of securi-
ties acceptable to the fund manager would out-perform his own. But
such an assumption seems unlikely, or at any rate unprovable. More-
over, there are always some (though admittedly few) withdrawals fol-
lowing submission of the preliminary report; hence the right to with-
draw cannot be regarded as meaningless or insubstantial.
Accordingly, if the Service, by placing stress on the factor of promoter
solicitation, means (or, at the time it issued the no-rulings release,
meant) to suggest that the formative procedure really involves a series
of disconnected transactions with the fund, the short answer is that
there are no completed transfers prior to the exchange date. In ad-
dition, since contributions to the fund follow a period of mutual
inspection and appraisal, it can hardly be said that the depositors act
wholly independently of one another in acquiring "control" of the
entity. It is true that concerted behavior on the part of the transferors
is the consequence of promoter activity rather than investor initiative,
37. See Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); Commissioner v. Segall.
114 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1940).
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but presumably this has relevance only if section 351 can be said to be
limited to small business formations and to exclude public issues.
Nothing in the language of the section points to such a limitation,
however, nor does it appear that the Service has previously attempted
to confine the application of the section to closely-held situations. 8
The requirement of "control" thus serves poorly as a means of pre-
venting the widescale pooling of investment property under section
351, and if this is the best technical objection that can be offered, it
is not difficult to understand why the Service has been unwilling to
declare itself in open opposition to the funds.
TAX POOLING AND TAX POSTPONEMENT
What may not be entirely clear, on the other hand, is whether an
analysis of the tax issues relating to the applicability of section 351 is
necessarily exhausted with the concession that the "control" require-
ment is met by virtue of the simultaneity of the exchange. There is,
in Subchapter C, no scarcity of precedent for the view that the fore-
seeable outcome of a particular arrangement purporting to qualify for
tax-free treatment has bearing on its tax status,"' and for this reason
one's attention is drawn to the way in which the funds are carried on
once the organizational procedure has been concluded. At the least,
a picture of the exchange fund as an investment medium is incomplete
without a description of its operating characteristics, both as they exist
and as they are represented to and contemplated by the depositors.
What, for example, is the effect upon the conduct of the fund's business
of the investor's well-emphasized objective to postpone tax? And how
does the pooling of individual tax liabilities affect the relationship
between the fund and its shareholders?
It is important to remember that the formation of an exchange fund,
if it qualifies as tax-free, involves not only a pooling of individually-
38. Thus, what is the effect under section 351 where the owners of appreciated property
contribute their assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange for stock and simulta-
neously therewith the corporation makes a public offering of its shares? The Service,
as far as is known, does not challenge the applicability of section 351 to the transfer of
the non-cash assets, even though the deal may be the dream-child of a promoter, and,
indeed, even though, as a consequence of the public offering, the non-cash transferors will
emerge with less than 80% of the corporation's stock. See American Bantam Car Co. v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948).
39. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661; Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951); S. Klein On the Square, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.
716 (1961); Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
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owned securities but also a pooling of individual tax-potential by rea-
son of the carryover of individual tax bases.40 Assuming the original
exchange is not taxable, the fund's portfolio will thus initially consist
exclusively of low-basis, high-value securities. For most funds, the bases
of securities exchanged by the individual investors for shares of the
fund average 10o%-15%o of the value of those securities at the exchange
date, and in consequence the assets of the fund are encumbered (or
are presumed to be encumbered) by a potential capital gains tax lia-
bility which at the formation of the fund may run above 20%" of the
value of the total portfolio. The carryover of individual tax bases and
the magnitude of the accumulated tax potential that results (again
presumed) represent the principal distinguishing features of the capital
exchange fund as compared with conventional mutual funds, and these
features have implications for the structure and operations of the
exchange funds which merit discussion.
Concerning the structure of the funds, it has been noted that the
funds are open-end with respect to share redemptions, but closed-end
with respect to share purchases. As in the case of conventional open-
end funds, the exchange funds stand ready at all times to redeem their
outstanding shares at net asset value. With limited exceptions, how-
ever, no new shares can be issued by the funds and no new investor
capital can be attracted. Unlike conventional investment companies,
which are either open at both ends or dosed at both ends, the stated
capital of the exchange funds can only decline as redemptions occur.
Since this prospect is undoubtedly a matter of considerable regret to the
fund manager, whose fee is computed as a percentage of net assets, there
must be a compelling reason for the dosed-in, open-out structure of
the exchange funds.
Essentially, the structure of the exchange funds reflects the necessity
of excluding outsiders from participation in the fund. To put it other-
wise, the peculiar open-and-closed arrangement is designed to protect
investor net worth against the probability-apparently regarded as
overwhelming-that the shares of the fund, if issued for cash or sold
in the public market, would have to be issued or sold at a discount
from net asset value.
40. I.R.C. § S62(a).
41. Le., 25% of 85%-90%.
42. The exceptions are of two kinds. First, at the shareholder's option, dividends from
net investment income may be paid in additional shares of the fund instead of cash. Sec-
ond, the funds may acquire the assets of private investment companies in exchange for
fund shares in tax-free mergers. As to the latter type of transaction, see notes 43 and
76 infra.
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Such a discount factor is probable because the assets of the exchange
fund are from the outset encumbered by an exceedingly large con-
tingent tax liability. Sale by the fund of all or a portion of the original
portfolio will necessarily result in the accrual of taxes previously post-
poned, and hence in a reduction to that extent of the net asset value
of outstanding shares. An incoming purchaser for cash, whether con-
templating the purchase of outstanding or newly issued fund shares,
would presumably be obliged to take that factor into account, that is,
to consider the effect of prospective tax accruals on the value of his
investment. As a consequence, unless he were prepared to pay an off-
setting premium for the services of management in supervising the
portfolio, such a purchaser would be expected to be unwilling to ac-
quire fund shares at a price equal to net asset value, and instead to
offer something less.
To illustrate the point, suppose the net asset value of outstanding
shares is $100 per share, of which $80 reflects unrealized appreciation
in the securities held by the fund. Assuming no change in the market
value of portfolio securities, the sale by the fund, over a period of time,
of the entire original portfolio would result in the realization by the
fund of $80 per share of capital gains. The fund would make tax pay-
ments over the same period of $20 per share on behalf of its share-
holders (25% of $80), and there would be an increase in the basis of
outstanding shares of $60 per share (75% of $80). Assuming no change
in the market value of the securities into which the proceeds of sale
were reinvested, the net asset value of fund shares after all original
securities had been sold would be reduced from $100 to $80 ($100,
original net asset value, minus $20, taxes paid).
An outsider who purchased fund shares for cash at $100 per share
at the beginning of the period would thus find that a portion of his
investment had been converted into tax payments by the end of the
period. The basis of his shares, it is true, would have been increased
to $160 per share ($100, original cost, plus $60, addition to basis), and
a sale of those shares at a price equal to net asset value at that time
would produce a capital loss of $80 per share ($160, adjusted basis,
minus $80, proceeds of sale), such loss being equivalent to the capital
gains previously recognized. But the prospect of trading hard cash for
a capital loss of restricted usefulness, the realization of which would
at all events necessitate his ceasing to participate in the fund, is pre-
sumably unappealing. Once again, therefore, unless management exerts
an offsetting attraction in his estimation, the prospective cash pur-
chaser, on perceiving that the fund contains a large accumulated tax
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potential, would be expected to bid less than net asset value for the
shares of the fund.
If, disregarding the management factor, it can be assumed that fund
shares would sell at a discount in the public market, the need for a
redemption privilege on the part of the original fund shareholders
becomes apparent. An original fund shareholder having a basis of
$20 for his fund shares and electing to redeem at a time when the net
asset value of fund shares is $100 would have an after-tax recovery of
$80 per share: $100 less tax of $20 (25% of the $80 gain). If the shares
were non-redeemable, and if the market price-reflecting a discount
of, say, 12.5% 43 of unrealized portfolio appreciation, or $10-were
$90, the seller's after-tax recovery would be only $72.50: $90 less tax of
$17.50 (25% of the $70 gain). The difference in net amount realized
of $7.50 per share (or $7,500 on an investment of $100,000, reported
to have been the average shareholder investment in one exchange
fund") results because the selling shareholder picks up in addition
to his own tax a portion of the prospective tax obligation assumed by
the purchaser. Accordingly, the exchange funds are obliged to include
an optional share redemption feature in order to avoid the prospect
of an immediate decline in the value of fund shares, a decline which
would tend to approximate the amount of the potential capital gains
43. The merger of a personal holding or private investment company owning sub-
stantially appreciated securities into a conventional mutual fund whose portfolio shows
a lesser degree of appreciation normally requires a compensating reduction in the ex-
change value of the private company's assets. On the assumption that the merger qualifies
as a tax-free reorganization (see note 76 infra), the basis of the assets acquired by the
fund will be the same as the basis of those assets in the hands of the private company.
To the extent that the element of unrealized appreciation in the assets acquired exceeds
the element of unrealized appreciation in the fund's portfolio at the time of the merger.
a net contingent tax liability is passed on to the present and future shareholders of the
fund, which will accrue as and when the acquired securities are sold. To adjust for this
disparity, under SEC practice a discount of 12.5% of the excess of the percentage of
appreciation of the private portfolio over that of the fund portfolio is applied to the
value of the acquired assets; the resulting figure then becomes the exchange price and
governs the number of fund shares to be received by the shareholders of the private com-
pany on the exchange. The 12.5% figure is simply the midpoint between zero and the
maximum capital gains tax rate of 25%. See, e.g., Fundamental Investors, Inc., SEC Inv.
Co. Act Release No. 3952 (1964); Broad Street Investing Corp., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release
No. 3884 (1964).
In the light of this discount procedure, the capital exchange funds would appear to be
better situated for merger with private investment companies than conventional mutual
funds. Since the element of unrealized appreciation in the exchange fund's portfolio is
likely to equal or exceed that of the private company, no discounting of the exchange
value of the private company's assets would be required. But despite this advantage, the
exchange funds seem to have attracted relatively little merger business so far.
44. Business Week, April 24, 1965, p. 148.
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tax to a purchaser for cash, reduced by any premium that such a pur-
chaser would be willing to pay for management.
Moving to the share purchase side, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is evidently unwilling to assume that the value of management
services can ever entirely offset the fund's inherent tax encumbrance,
since the Commission has required the exchange funds to agree not to
engage in any future offering of their shares to the public, either on
a continuous basis or at intervals.46 Although it is difficult to believe
that such a safeguard is really needed (or warranted), quite obviously
the prohibition is intended to protect unsuspecting buyers from ac-
quiring a share in the fund's tax potential at full cost. A continuous
(or occasional) offering of shares for cash at a discount, moreover, if
feasible, would be unacceptable to the original shareholders since the
effect would be to dilute the net asset value of the shares issued to
them on the original exchange and thus in effect to actualize a portion
of their tax.4
6
A similar set of observations is to be made about the relationship
that exists among the fund shareholders themselves. It may be sup-
posed that many and indeed most fund shareholders will cease to
enjoy an individual benefit from tax-deferral well before the accumu-
lated tax potential in the fund has disappeared. This is obviously true
with respect to those fund shareholders who, preferring other invest-
ment opportunities to the advantage of tax-deferral, elect to redeem
their shares in a taxable transaction. But it is also likely to be true of
a substantial number of the fund shareholders who choose to stay with
the fund and avoid a taxable redemption. Owing to adjustments in the
bases of their shares, occurring either by reason of portfolio turnover
at the fund level or by reason of the death of the shareholder himself,
investors in the second group (or their estates) will ultimately hold their
fund shares at a tax basis equal to or approximating the net asset value
of those shares. Thus the certain effect of death, or alternatively the
long run effect of portfolio turnover, is to put the continuing share-
holder (or his estate) in the position of having made a fully tax-paid
45. See, e.g., Congress Street Fund, SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 3118 (Oct., 1960);
Federal Street Fund, Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 3206 (March 2, 1961); Ohio Frank-
lin Fund, Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 3247 (May 11, 1961).
46. Thus, where the promoters of a newly formed mutual fund provide its initial
capitalization by contributing their own appreciated securities, under SEC practice the net
asset value of fund shares, for purposes of determining the public offering price of such
shares to cash purchasers, is computed by setting aside a reserve for future capital gains
tax equal to 12.5% of the unrealized appreciation in the promoters' contributed securities.
See, e.g., Ivest Fund, Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 3292 (July 18, 1961).
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investment in the fund at a price equal to net asset value, just as if the
shares were then purchased at net asset value for cash. The important
point is that this position will often be attained at a time when the fund
itself is still encumbered by a more or less substantial accumulated tax
factor.
With respect to portfolio turnover, it is to be noted that while none
of the shareholders acquires his original shares for cash, all contributing
appreciated property, there evidently is a considerable range of basis-
to-value ratios among the shareholders at the time the fund is formed.4 7
To the extent that original portfolio items are traded out of the port-
folio, a capital gains tax accrues to the fund reducing net assets, and
the tax basis of the fund shares in the hands of the individual investor
is adjusted upwards by 75%o of his share of the gain recognized.48 As this
process goes forward year by year, however slowly, those shareholders
whose individual bases are at (or reach) the higher end of the range
will find that their own need or opportunity for tax deferral has dis-
appeared, although the fund itself continues to hold a portfolio of
appreciated securities.
In the other alternative, the death of the shareholder will have the
same effect. If fund activity were wholly lacking, or if (whatever the
pace of fund activity) the particular shareholder is still in a position
to benefit from tax-deferral at the time death occurs, then at death, as
the law stands,49 the basis of the decedent's shares will be increased to
equal their net asset value. Again, however, fund assets would still be
expected to show a measure of unrealized appreciation in many cases.
Whether through portfolio activity or death, therefore, the con-
tinuing fund shareholder (or his executor) is likely to find himself in
the position of having made (by force of circumstance) the very com-
mitment which a purchaser for cash is presumed to be unwilling to
47. The funds' initial reports to investors-which contain a list of all securities to be
exchanged for fund shares, including for each security its value and tax basis--show that
the bases of the various securities to be exchanged range from zero to 60% of market
value. While it cannot be ascertained from the reports whether a given investor has trans.
ferred more than one security, or whether the funds' holdings of a particular security are
derived from more than one investor, it seems reasonable to assume-for example, in the
case of zero-basis securities having substantial value-that at least some securities are
received from a single investor and represent his entire contribution. In any event, as
noted, the fund prospectuses specifically state that "there will undoubtedly be considerable
variation in the degree of unrealized appreciation of the assets of the various investors.
. Prospectus of Second Congress Street Fund, Inc. 5 (Jan. 16, 1964).
48. See note 20 supra. I.R.C. § 852 (b)(3)(D)(iii).
49. I.R.C. § 1014(a), providing that the basis of property in the hands of a person
acquiring the property from a decedent shall be the value of the property at the date of
the decedents death (or its value at the alternate estate tax valuation date).
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make in the first instance, i.e., the "acquisition" of fund shares at a
cost equal to net asset value despite a substantial accumulated tax
potential in the fund. This position is necessarily disadvantageous, if
not untenable. On the assumption that management is not then likely
to command a premium, it appears that once the shareholder's own
individual tax potential has been actualized through the realization
of gains at the fund level, or has been forgiven by reason of death,
he or his heirs will be strongly prompted to draw down the net
asset value of his shares by presenting those shares for redemption.
If the shareholder retains his shares, and the balance of the fund's
tax potential subsequently accrues, a portion of the shareholder's in-
vestment will be converted into tax payments accompanied by a fur-
ther adjustment in the basis of his shares. Again, unless he is prepared
to pay a premium for management, the shareholder whose tax-deferral
needs have been relieved by events would be expected to find the
latter prospect unacceptable.
Assume, for example, that A, B and C pool their securities in a fund.
Each security has a value of $100, but A's basis is zero, B's basis is $30,
and C's basis is $60, for the security transferred. The fund thus receives
property having an aggregate value of $300 of which $210 is unrealized
appreciation ($300 minus the sum of 0, $30 and $60). The basis of A,
B and C for their fund shares is the same as the basis of the securities
exchanged therefore, i.e., 0, $30 and $60 repectively. Assume the fund
realizes gains of $120 during a given period of one or more years. The
fund pays a total tax on such gains of $30 (25% of $120), or $10 on
behalf of each shareholder, which payment reduces the value of fund
assets to $270 and the net asset value of each shareholder's interest to
$90. At the same time the basis of all fund shares is increased by $90
(75% of $120) or $30 for each of the three shareholders.
C, who began with a basis of $60 for his fund shares, now has a basis
of $90, which is also equal to the net asset value of the shares as reduced
by tax payments. The fund's portfolio, however, still contains $90 of
unrealized appreciation. Since his own opportunity for tax-deferral has
come to an end, C will presumably elect to redeem his shares at this
point, unless management is highly valued. If C does redeem, then B,
whose basis has been increased from $30 to $60, will be in the position
that C previously occupied once the fund has realized further gains of
$60.50 And if any of the shareholders, including A, should die prior to a
50. Thus, on redeeming C's shares for $90, the value of fund assets is reduced to $180
($270 minus $90). Realization of an additional $60 of gain by the fund results in a tax
of $15 (25% of $60). The value of fund assets is reduced thereby to s165 ($180 minus $15),
[Vol. 75:183
EXCHANGE FUNDS
complete turnover of the fund's portfolio, the decedent's estate would
then occupy a like status, i.e., the fund shares received from the de-
cedent would have a basis equal to their net asset value, although the
fund itself retained a substantial accumulated tax potential. In each
case, unless he anticipates an offsetting benefit from the services of
management, the shareholder would be expected to redeem his shares
promptly because of the prospect of further accruals of tax.5'
Turning next to the operating characteristics of the funds, a striking
though readily anticipated consequence of the exchange fund arrange-
ment is the comparatively low rate of portfolio turnover which is uni-
formly characteristic of the funds. According to a report in Fortune
Magazine, "The average mutual fund has annually turned over about
a sixth of its portfolio in recent years, the average swap fund only about
a sixteenth."5 2 Actually, the difference appears to be even greater in
most instances. Thus the rate of portfolio turnover may be approxi-
mated by relating the value of portfolio transactions for the year
(purchases plus sales, divided in half to avoid double counting) to the
and the net asset value of each remaining shareholder's interest is reduced to $82.50. B's
basis for his fund shares, which had been $60, is increased to $82.50 by addition of 75%
of his share of the fund's realized gain ($60, basis, plus one-half of 75% of the $60 gain),
although the fund's portfolio then still contains $30 of unrealized appreciation.
The example, being for illustrative purposes only, assumes that C received cash on
redemption of his fund shares. The effect as to B admittedly would be altered if C instead
received a distribution of low-basis portfolio securities. See text at note 24 supra. Where
there is a large number of shareholders, however, while those at the lower end of the
range may find their opportunities for tax-deferral enhanced by a combination of sales
and distributions in kind to those at the higher end, a substantial number of investors
who continue with the fund can nevertheless be expected to be in C's position in time.
Moreover, as stated, the effect of death on the basis of fund shares is independent of
portfolio turnover.
51. It is true that section 1014, under which the basis of property acquired from a
decedent is adjusted to equal its value at the decedents death, is a tax rule and not an
immutable economic circumstance. But tax rules-e.g., the non-taxability of unrealized
gains and losses as opposed to their recognition if the property is sold-are presumably
a vital aspect of the total environment in which a transaction arises, as the exchange fund
device well illustrates. See also Knetsch v. US., 364 US. 361 (1960). Moreover, in view. of
recent unsuccessful efforts to modify section 1014, it appears that any significant change
in the death-basis rule is exceedingly remote. See S. RFP. No. 830, 88th Cong.. 2d Sess.
161 (1964). At all events, the analysis in the text would be affected only if the section
were altered to provide for a carryover of the decedent's basis to his heirs; there would be
no effect if, as the Treasury proposed in 1962, death were treated as an oomsion for the
realization of capital gains. If, as some have said, the "locked-in" syndrome largely de-
pends on the existence of a rule which wholly forgives tax at death, see Holt & Shelton,
supra note 2, at 352, then not only would the substitution of a carryover basis rule affect
the analysis of existing exchange funds, but the further proliferation of such funds would
come to a halt and the entire problem would lose importance.
52. Fortune, May, 1965, p. 64.
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average value of assets held by the fund during the same period. One
would exclude the value of securities distributed in redemption and
sold to pay dealers' fees, since these transactions obviously create no
reinvestment opportunities for the fund. On this basis, for fiscal years
ending in 1964, the average portfolio turnover rate for all funds having
assets in excess of $20 million was less than 3.5%.53 (It may be noted
that although the exchange funds engage in much less portfolio activity
than conventional funds, they do not, and in prudence cannot, avoid
sale-and-reinvestment activity altogether. In addition, since the secu-
rities that are sold from time to time are substantially appreciated secu-
rities, the proportion of such sales constituting realized capital gain is
necessarily very high.5 4)
To some extent the difference in rate of turnover between conven-
tional funds and exchange funds is attributable to the fact that the
latter accept a limited quantity of "hot" stock--control stock and stock
held under an investment representation-which cannot readily be
disposed of by reason of restrictions arising under the Securities Act. 5
In even greater measure, however, the low turnover rate of the ex-
change funds is explained by the very purpose for which the funds are
formed, namely, to permit the locked-in investor to improve his market
position without the recognition of capital gain. This purpose is not
exhausted by the tax-free formation of the funds. Indeed, that is merely
the beginning. The funds, by their own advertisement, are intended to
appeal to investors "who feel prevented from diversifying because of
what they consider to be the excessive tax cost of selling appreciated
53. A higher turnover rate obtained in the case of two smaller funds-Centennial Fund
and Second Centennial Fund-having assets under $20 million.
54. Thus, for example, Westminster Fund sold $5.7 million worth of securities during
its fiscal year ended June 30, 1963. Of this amount, $3 million represented realized capital
gain, and the tax payable on behalf of shareholders was $750,000, or slightly more than
20% of total sales. Annual Report of Westminster Fund, Inc. 11-12 (June 30, 1963).
55. By agreement with the SEC, the exchange funds limit the percentage of restricted
stock in the initial portfolio to 15% of the total portfolio; see Prospectus of Presidential
Exchange Fund, Inc. 2 (April 19, 1965). Since the funds are open to share redemptions,
a larger proportion of restricted stock in the portfolio would presumably create a risk
that such stock would be sold to the public (or redistributed, but not necessarily to the
original contributor) if redemption demands grew heavy. It has reported that some closed-
end funds have recently been formed solely or largely for the purpose of acquiring re-
stricted stock, the intent being to open the fund after waiting for a period of time which,
it is thought, will satisfy the original investment representation. See Hill, Jr., Rule 154
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and Related Problems-A Proposed Solution, 20 Bus.
LAw 335, 341 (1965). And see Registered Exchange Fund, Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release
No. 4232 (April 29, 1965).
[Vol. 75,183
EXCHANGE FUNDS
assets." 6 It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that a large proportion
of the investors who go into the exchange funds do so as an alternative
to the continued holding of their original securities.
The assumption must be that were the funds to engage in portfolio
activity at what is evidently a normal rate for investment companies of
equal size, they would as to many and perhaps most investors become
tax-precipitation rather than tax-postponement devices and substan-
tially lose their attraction. Even for those investors who otherwise
planned an immediate taxable sale of their securities, the accrual of a
major portion of the fund's tax potential within, say, a 5 to 10 year
period would render the value of the tax-deferral privilege marginal.
And for those investors having a higher-than-average basis for their
contributed securities, the prospect of being forced out of the fund, as
it were, at a relatively early date would make it inadvisable to pay the
dealer's commision that is assessed at the inception of the fund.
Far from hastening the recognition of gain through ordinary
management activity, however, the exchange funds are expected to
permit those investors who would in any case have retained their
original securities beyond the fund formation date-and no doubt
many wealthy investors are estate oriented-to postpone the moment
of taxable realization for a period at least as long as might have been
foreseen with respect to those original securities, but to do so while
enjoying the benefits of diversification. The primary exercise of mana-
gerial judgment is in the selection and rejection of securities originally
offered for exchange, and is thus supposed to have occurred before the
fund is formed. The better that judgment has been, the more the
shareholders will have succeeded in achieving their postponement
objectives. To the extent that the fund manager is actually required to
"manage" after the fund is formed (other than by selecting securities
for distribution in redemption), the purpose of the arrangement is,
strictly speaking, frustrated. Although some management activity is
obviously unavoidable, it may be supposed that many fund share-
holders are amply supplied with investment counsel from other sources
and have no pressing need for additional advisory services; the ex-
change funds are not (or are not yet) for the small investor1
7
56. Prospectus of Centennial management And Research Corporation 3 (Dec. 23, 1960)
(Emphasis added).
57. See Business Week, April 24, 1965, p. 148. The implication of the low rate of
portfolio turnover from the standpoint of the Treasury is that no appreciable anticipation
of taxable gain results from the displacement of individual decision-making by profes-
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An additional and related aspect of the exchange fund's operating
pattern also deserves brief comment. Not only is the rate of portfolio
turnover comparatively low, but the value of securities sold by the
funds is in most instances exceeded, and in some substantially ex-
ceeded, by the value of securities annually distributed in redemption of
outstanding shares.5s This is true, moreover, even though redemptions
are presumably at their lowest level in the early years of the fund. On
the whole, therefore, and with few exceptions, the exchange funds are
chiefly in the share repurchase business, if "business" for this purpose is
measured and defined by comparing the value of securities disposed of
through sale with that of securities distributed in redemption.
This observable relationship between portfolio activity and redemp-
tions is consistent with the premise that the fund's aim, within the
limits of prudence, is to avoid precipitating the individual share-
holder's tax liability. Thus the occasion for taxable realization of gain
is primarily intended to be selected by the investor himself, in the
light of his own tax and investment needs, and is only secondarily a
matter for the judgment of the fund manager.
The exchange funds thus present a total operating picture that
is odd by conventional standards, although the picture becomes less
strange when one takes account of what the funds are really all about.
The fact that portfolio activity is comparatively low, and that it is
frequently secondary to redemption activity, suggests, or confirms, that
fund management is concerned more with the fulfillment of share-
holder tax-postponement objectives than with the ordinary conduct
of an investment management service. It has, of course, not escaped
notice that the performance record of the exchange funds as a group is
poor compared to that of conventional funds, even when the compari-
son is between exchange funds and conventional funds which are
sional management. Fund shareholders who elect to redeem their shares In a taxable
transaction would presumably have switched out of their original investments at or prior
to redemption anyway. And the "imposition" of gains tax on continuing shareholders Is
at so slow a pace that any difference between it and what the shareholders would be likely
to have imposed upon themselves may well be inconsequential.
58. Thus, for example, Diversification Fund sold $864,000 of securities, and distributed
securities having a value of $3,908,000 in redemption of outstanding shares, during its
fiscal year ended May 31, 1964. Annual Report of Diversification Fund, Inc., f/y/C May
31, 1964, p. 10. Devonshire Street Fund received $734,000 as proceeds from sales of securi-
ties during its fiscal year ended March 31, 1964, and redeemed fund shares with an aggre-
gate value of $3,009,000 in the same period. Annual Report of Devonshire Street Fund,




managed by the same investment management organization.rO Of
course, comparisons of this sort are in a sense incomplete if they fail
to take into account the initial reduction in net worth which the ex-
change fund investor would have sustained had he sold his appreciated
securities and invested the after-tax proceeds in the shares of a con-
ventional fund. Obviously the proper comparison from the investors'
standpoint is between the results obtained by the exchange funds and
the results obtained through "normal" management activity on an
initial capital investment reduced by tax.
These observations about the role of exchange fund management
have bearing, inferentially at least, on the question whether an in-
vestor whose individual tax-deferral needs have been relieved might
nevertheless be inclined to retain those shares by reason of a favorable
evaluation of management. As suggested, the existence at such time of
a substantial tax potential in the portfolio would be expected to prompt
the shareholder to redeem his shares in order to avoid the build-up of a
capital loss potential, unless the other variable-management--com-
mands an offsetting premium in his estimation. But since fund manage-
ment is obliged, by the advertised goals of the fund device itself, to be
much less than normally active in seeking to enhance the value of fund
shares, the evaluation of management is hardly likely to outweigh the
tax encumbrance factor and indeed is much more likely to provide an
additional incentive to redemption.
To state the same point in another way, the exchange funds lack
true continuity as investment media (although this is obviously of little
concern to the particular investor seeking the temporary protection of
a diversified portfolio). The duration of the tax-deferral period for
the several fund shareholders is necessarily uneven, either because the
amounts of tax deferred were unequal at the time the fund was formed
or because death will end the individual's need for further tax deferral.
Hence a good many and perhaps most fund shareholders (who have
not previously redeemed their shares in a taxable transaction) are
59. "Four of the eight swap funds that have been in existence since September 1, 1951.
had higher asset values per share on that date than on March 31, 1955. The best of the
eight, the Diversification Fund, increased by 18% over the period. The Dow-Jones indus-
trial average, meanwhile, increased by 30% (both figures include dividends)." Fortune,
May, 1965, p. 64. For a similar view, see Forbes, Jan. 1, 1955, p. 136, stating also that
although it "is far too early to tell, ... it may be that formations of swap funds cor-
respond for psychological reasons with bull market tops" at 137. A dissenting opinion-
based, however, on a performance analysis which begins shortly after the May, 1952 market
break-appears in Business Week, April 24, 1965, p. 148.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
likely to find themselves obliged to consider the fund on its merits as
an investment medium at a time when the fund is still expected to
provide deferral benefits for other shareholders who had lower in-
dividual bases to start with or who are longer-lived. The investment
merits of the fund, at that time, depend on two variables, accumulated
tax potential and management. Tax potential is always a discount
factor and may be expected to prompt redemption unless offset by a
favorable evaluation of management. But since the purpose of man-
agement, once the fund is formed, is to permit investors' capital to
"fructify" by avoiding the precipitation of tax, and since this purpose
results in a comparatively passive management policy, the evaluation
of management services is likely to be negative as well. With both
variables negative, the investor has strong reason to terminate his in-
terest by redemption. In consequence, the role of the fund is ultimately
that of an agency for the redistribution of property among the mem-
bers of the original transferor group (or their estates).
Whether inference and prediction at this level will support a legal
argument is, admittedly, uncertain. One is tempted to suggest, how-
ever, that a challenge to the applicability of section 351 might be made
with some chance of success if the operating and redemption pattern
of the funds could be said to be foreseeable at the time the funds are
formed. Thus one may concede the broadest application for the section
-that it applies to the formation of a corporation, including an invest-
ment company, by any number of unrelated persons and for any
purpose whatever (indeed without articulation of a purpose)-and still
assert that it does not extend to the formation of an entity whose prin-
cipal and intended function is to redistribute the assets transferred to
it among the several transferors.60 Presumably the section does not exist
60. While the problem is admittedly unusual, the decision of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals in W. & K. Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 B.T.A. 830 (1938), at least raises the
issue. The controlling shareholders of the taxpayer-corporation transferred to It, in ex-
change for callable preferred stock, certain securities having a market value substantially
below cost. The taxpayer was expected to realize a large gain from the sale of real estate
during the taxable year and it was intended to create an offsetting loss by having the
taxpayer sell the securities in the same period. The taxpayer did sell the securities and
in a subsequent period distributed most of the proceeds to the shareholders by calling
their preferred. The taxpayer and the shareholders both claimed deductible losses, the
taxpayer on the sale of the securities, the shareholders on redemption of their stock. The
Commissioner, contending that the transfer of the securities to the taxpayer lacked a
business purpose other than tax-minimization, treated the original exchange as a closed
transaction and disallowed both losses on the ground that the basis of the securities fi
the taxpayer's hands and of the preferred stock in the shareholders' hands was equal to
the value of the securities at the date of the exchange. It is to be noted that the Coln-
missioner did not argue that the transfer of securities should be disregarded as fictitious,
[Vol. 75:183
EXCHANGE FUNDS
in order to postpone tax for its own sake, but contemplates an asset-
ownership readjustment in which the corporate transferee obtains the
same permanent rights in the property transferred as those which the
transferors possessed previously. If, however, the transferors intend that
the assets transferred shall subsequently be redistributed among them
(whether or not in original form 1), and if redistribution is foreseen in
definite terms at the time of transfer, arguably the arrangement is not
an asset-ownership readjustment at all but in effect accomplishes an
exchange of property among the shareholders themselves. Theoreti-
cally at least, the time-gap between the original exchange and the subse-
quent receipt of the proceeds thereof is merely one bit of evidence
bearing on the relationship between the two events.0 2 The ultimate
but rather that the exchange itself fell without the scope of section 351, and the Board
considered the issue on that basis.
The Board, with four dissenting votes, found for the taxpayers, indicating that it re-
garded the business purpose doctrine set forth in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935), as inapplicable to transactions meeting the literal requirements of section 351. But
see Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937). discussed in 3
MERTE-Ns, LAW OF FEnERAL INcomE TAXATON § 20.46; Rev. Rul. 55-36, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL.
340. This, however, as the balance of the brief W. & K. Holding Corp. opinion shows,
meant merely that the Board would not deny the applicability of the section becmuse the
transfer had been motivated solely by tax savings. Thus the Board felt it necessary to find,
as a fact, that there had been no preexisting agreement to redeem the preferred stock.
If, as the dissent thought, such an agreement did exist or could be inferred, the result
would presumably have been otherwise, whether Gregory principles applied or noL Clearly
enough, the case ultimately turned on the narrow factual issue of whether the corporation
had intended to distribute the proceeds of the securities, with the court, somewhat re-
markably, finding this issue for the taxpayers. Had the Board concluded that the redemp-
tion was integral to the original exchange, the latter event would no doubt have been
treated, in the Board's words, as "a sale with payment deferred."
The problem in a sense is the inverse of that presented by the "reincorporation" cases.
See Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955). Compare Standard Realization
Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 708 (1948).
61. See W. & K. Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 60.
62. See Mintz and Plumb, Jr., Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizatons, N.Y.U.
12TH INsr. ON FED. TAX 247, 249 (1954). And see Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42
(1962); Rosenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 716 (1961). In Rosenberg's Estate, the
taxpayers, shareholders in a family corporation, in a recapitalization received new com-
mon stock plus Class B preferred stock in exchange for their old common. The Class B
preferred stock was convertible into Class A preferred stock, the latter, unlike the former,
being subject to a mandatory redemption provision which provided for retirement of 7%
of the outstanding Class A shares annually. Shortly after the recapitalization, the tax-
payers sold their Class B preferred to certain institutional investors, which promptly
exercised the conversion privilege. The court, emphasizing the ultimate effect of the
mandatory redemption feature, sustained the Commissioner in finding that the sale of
the Class B preferred was equivalent to a cash dividend distribution from the corporation
to the taxpayers. Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1963), reached a con-
trary result on similar facts. Both cases arose under the 1939 Code and prior to the enact-
ment of present section 306.
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question is whether redistribution is integral to the exchange fund
arrangement as a whole; whether exchange and redistribution repre-
sent a cycle. If this question can be answered affirmatively, the original
exchange of securities for shares of the fund would appear to constitute
a sale of property with payment deferred at the option of the payee,
and it might on that account be viewed as a closed transaction.
Further, since only "stock or securities" are permitted to be received
tax-free in a section 351 exchange, another and narrower way of ex-
pressing the same conclusion may also be at hand. Without pausing to
consider whether the "continuity of interest" doctrine 3 developed
under the reorganization sections applies with equal effect under sec-
tion 351, 64 it is evident that the terms "stock" and "securities" are
subject to a largely analogous construction and are to be read and
understood in the light of the statutory purpose to distinguish between
sales of property and mere asset-ownership readjustments. 5 Consistent
with this aim, the term "securities," although permitting the receipt
of debt under section 351, has been interpreted to exclude short-term
obligations on the ground that such obligations have a near-cash
status.66 Whatever uncertainty there may be about the requisite dura-
63. "Requisite to a reorganization under the Code [is] ... a continuity of interest...
on the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise
prior to the reorganization." Regs. § 1.368-1(b). The familiar history of tie "continuity of
interest" doctrine is summarized in BrnKFmR, FEDERAL INCOMVE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHARHoLDERs 393-99 (1959). In Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1932), the properties of one corporation were acquired by another in exchange
for short-term promissory notes plus cash. Although there was literal compliance with the
statutory definition of a "reorganization" as it then stood, the court held that "reorganiza-
tion" contemplates "a continuance of interest" on the part of the transferors and that such
a "continuance" was lacking in the circumstances. The Supreme Court reached the same
result in a similar transaction in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S.
462 (1933), stating that to qualify for tax-free treatment "the seller must acquire an Interest
in the affairs of the purchasing company more definite than that incident to ownership
of its short-term purchase-money notes." Id. at 470. The Court held also that the short-term
notes did not qualify as "securities." But see, as always, Griswold, Securities and Continuity
of Interest, 58 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1945). And see, Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296
U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935); Helvering v. Watts,
296 U.S. 387 (1935); LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
64. See BrrER, op. cit. supra, note 63, at 77-78.
65. Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 194t0). See BnrrKr, op. cit.
supra, note 63, at 75-76.
66. It is usually said that debt having a term of less than 5 years will not qualify as
"securities" under section 351. See discussion in Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 Cuat. BULL. 193,
holding that notes of less than 4 years' maturity are not "securities." Short-term debt was
found not to constitute "securities" in the Pinellas case, supra, note 63, and It has been
held that the term "securities" has the same meaning for purposes of section 351 as II
the reorganization provisions. Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1941).
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tion of qualifying indebtedness, it is thus apparent that "securities"
is not a term of unlimited application. No more reason exists to sup-
pose that "stock" is always self-defining, 67 or that it includes anything
other than the evidence of a long-term and continuous capital com-
mitment on the part of a taxpayer seeking non-recognition under the
section.
As an original matter, it might be doubted whether corporate shares
which are fully redeemable at the holder's option constitute "stock"
for the purposes of section 351 and the analogous reorganization pro-
visions. A security, however designated, which entitles its holder to
withdraw corporate assets at will hardly qualifies as evidence of an ex-
tended commitment of capital to the corporate enterprise. Indeed a
selling feature of such redeemable shares is that they maximize the
holder's independence from the corporation by enabling him to termi-
nate his participation by "putting" his shares to the corporation at net
asset value whenever he chooses. To be sure, the owner of non-redeem-
able shares can terminate his interest in the corporation through sale.
But the ability to sell does not assure a price equal to the liquidation
value of the corporate assets attributable to the seller's shares, as is
evident from the fact that the shares of many closed-end investment
companies are available at a discount from net asset value., More-
over, a sale of outstanding shares, unlike a redemption, has no effect
on the corporation's ability to retain control of its property. 9 It is also
true that the redemption privilege is optional rather than mandatory
and in theory need never be exercised. This, however, may be less
significant under the "continuity of interest" test (or alternatively
under the requirement of "stock or securities") than the fact that the
shareholder is thereby free to withdraw invested capital at will.70 Thus
67. See Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960), holding that certain
certificates of contingent interest were "stock" rather than "other property" within section
356(a)(1). And see Regs. § 1.351-1(a)(1), stating that stock rights or stock warrants are not
"stock or securities" under section 351; Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194
(1942).
68. See ARTHUR W'SNBERGER, INVESMENT CosnPAmNEs 286-89 (1965 ed.).
69. "Shareholders of mutual funds have a power unparalleled in stockholders elsewhere.
They can strip the fund of assets; for they do not merely sell, they redeem. Fund managers
live under the shadow of this power, and it haunts every move they make. Unlike other
corporate managers who retain control of assets unaffected by turnover of the stockholder
list, fund managers have, at daily hazard, the disappearance of the fruits of their labor
and expense." Lobell, A Critique of the Wharton School Report on Mutual Funds, 49 VA.
L. REv. 1, 54 (1963).
70. The status under "continuity of interest" principles of stock redeemable at the
holder's option seems to have received little public consideration, although the question is
adverted to in the American Law Institute study infra, note 80, at 284. See also, Rev.
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no one would suppose that a demand note is to be treated as a "secu-
rity" under section 351 or the reorganization sections merely because
the note holder may choose to continue his investment on a day-to-day
basis.71
Speaking generally, open-end mutual funds, including those of the
conventional variety, exhibit both corporate and non-corporate charac-
teristics. In their corporate aspect, the funds serve as a vehicle for the
formation of an asset pool of sufficient size to attract the services of
professional management and to make possible extensive portfolio
diversification. In their non-corporate aspect, they are obliged to permit
their participants to withdraw corporate capital at pleasure. The latter,
however, is perfectly consistent with the well-accepted proposition that
the relationship of shareholder to fund is essentially that of customer
to supplier: 72 if the shareholder grows dissatisfied with the investment
service provided by the fund, it is understood that he will end his
patronage by presenting his shares for redemption. State corporate
laws which bar the issuance of shares redeemable at the holder's option
thus usually make an exception for the shares of open-end investment
companies, 73 presumably in recognition of the fact that share owner-
ship really represents a terminable service contract and that the cor-
poration need have no "backbone" 74 in the traditional sense of a per-
manent commitment to stated capital.
Rul. 56-345, 1956-2 Curi. BULL. 206. It has been held that preferred stock callable by the
issuing corporation on 30 days' notice meets the continuity of interest test, Schweitzer &
Conrad Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 533 (1940), but such a provision is easily distin-
guished from one entitling the shareholders to withdraw at will. The call feature is for
the protection of the corporation, not the shareholders, and there is no assurance that the
latter's stock will ever be redeemed. Closer to the situation at hand, perhaps, is preferred
stock subject to a fixed redemption date. Although the Supreme Court In John A, Nelson
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935), found the requisite continuity where assets were
transferred for redeemable preferred stock and cash, the Court did not refer to the
redemption feature of the shares received, having chiefly been concerned to state that the
absence of voting rights and management participation was no bar to a "reorganization."
The Board of Tax Appeals, on the other hand, stressing the provision for retirement,
viewed the stock as amounting to "little more" than the short-term purchase money notes
that had been condemned in the Pinellas case. 28 B.T.A. 529, 542.
The focus of the reorganization provisions, and of section 351, is on the exchanging
shareholder, with the intention being to relieve him of gain recognition in appropriate
circumstances, and the continuity of interest requirement, therefore, tests the strength of
the shareholder's commitment to the entity. Arguably, an option to withdraw invested
capital at will reveals a basic absence of commitment, even though, at a given moment,
the option remains unexercised.
71. See note 66 supra.
72. See ARTHuR WIESENBERGER, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 21.
73. See CALIF. Coa'. CODE §§ 1101 and 1716.




But appropriate as it is to the customer-supplier relationship, the
privilege of free redemption may be inconsistent with the purpose of
section 351 in permitting two or more persons to form a corporation
without recognition of taxable gain. In effect, the question is whether
there is a true pooling of assets in these circumstances, 7 or whether
the terminable nature of the service relationship, which is specifically
intended, vitiates the tax-free exchange. In return for his appreciated
property, the investor receives, among other things, a right to obtain
cash or its equivalent in marketable securities from the corporation
on demand. In this respect at least, the transaction bears little resem-
blance to the formal asset-ownership readjustment that is contemplated
by the section.
One is aware, nevertheless, that mergers in which conventional
mutual funds play the role of acquiring corporation are common, and
that the Service generally does not view the presence of redeemable
shares as a bar to tax-free status.78 The optional nature of the re-
75. Compare Conwill, Blight or Blessing? The Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds,
18 Bus. LAw 663 (1963): "These two features-redemption and continuous offering--distin-
guish the mutual fund or open-end company from the dosed-end investment company.
A dosed-end company neither redeems its shares nor engages in a continuous public
offering of its shares .... The dosed-end operation is a pool and mutual operation in a
real sense, but for some reason obscure to me industry parlance uses the term "mutual
fund" only in relation to open-end companies." Id. at 663-64.
76. "More than $300 million have been added to investment company assets during the
past seven years through the merger of personal holding or private investment companies
with existing mutual funds and dosed-end companies. Approximately eighty mergers of
this type have taken place. The private funds involved have ranged in size from $39 million
downward to about $200,000." ARaitun WEsENBERGc-, op. cit. supra note 68, at 96.
In TI.R. 309 (March 3, 1961), the Service announced that no rulings would be issued on
the applicability of section 368, relating to tax-free reorganizations, to the acquisition by
one investment company of another "where, as a result of such acquisition, the shareholders
of either company, or both companies, thereby achieve a substantially wider diversification
of the investment assets underlying their stock holdings." The Release principally affects
two types of situations. In the first, a dosely-held operating company terminates its business
and converts its operating assets into cash. Since liquidation would produce a capital gains
tax to the shareholders, the company instead merges into a public investment company,
with the shareholders surrendering their closely-held stock for shares of the fund. In the
second, a private investment company already in possession of a portfolio of securities
desires to obtain professional management services by merging into a public investment
company. In both cases, since the only consideration paid by the public company for the
assets or shares of the private company will be voting stock, it is expected that the trans-
action will qualify as a reorganization, e.g., under section 368 (a)(1)(C), and that receipt of
the public company's stock by the shareholders of the private company will be tax-free
under section 354(a). See generally, Greene, Tax Techniques of Acquisitions by Mutuals
of Closely Held Investment Companies, 13 J. TAxATioN 2 (1960). See also note 43 supra.
Following TJ.R. 309, the Service apparently for a time refused to issue rulings even
where the element of "wider diversification" was lacking. See Bierman et al., supra note 9,
at 998. fore recently, however, the Service has recommenced to issue favorable rulings on
a showing that the securities held by the private company are distributed among the same
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demption privilege (any shareholder who desires to do so may retain
his shares indefinitely), together with the view that redemption is a
mere alternative to sale (the issuing corporation simply makes the
market in its shares), may be the reasons for the Service's permissive-
ness in this connection. 7 But even if these points are accepted as sup-
porting non-recognition for redeemable shares generally, the fact is
that neither applies without considerable qualification to the shares
of an exchange fund.
As previous analysis has shown, the period of share ownership in the
exchange fund is as a practical matter likely to be limited by the
investor's tax-postponement needs, redemption being a predictable
event rather than an indefinite one.7 8 In contrast, the owner of shares
categories--"Automotive," "Banks & Financial," etc.-as those of the public fund. Note,
22 J. TAXATION 62 (1965). Here, however, the anticipated ground for an attack by the
Service-failure to continue the business of the merging company-was apparently aban-
doned as a consequence of adverse court decisions. Rev. Rul. 63-29, 1963-1 CB 77; Bentsen
v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961). See also, Tarleau, "Continuity ol the
Business Enterprise" in Corporate Reorganizations and Other Corporate Read justmIents,
60 COLUM. L. REv. 792 (1960).
Quite obviously, a reexamination by the Service of the tax status of shares redeemable
at the holder's option would have consequences for mergers involving mutual funds as the
acquiring party.
77. See Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 945, 950 (1934),
on rehearing, 32 B.T.A. 701, aff'd, 84 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1936).
78. Central to the legal arguments suggested in the text is the point that the ownership
of shares in an exchange fund is necessarily temporary. This "temporariness" is a conse-
quence of the pooling by large numbers of investors of deferred tax liabilities which cur-
rently are or ultimately will be unequal. However, the deferral of tax depends in the first
place upon the assumption that section 351 is applicable to the original exchange. If
section 351 did not apply, the fund would be equivalent to one that had been formed for
cash, and none of the circumstances stressed in the analysis would obtain. Accordingly, It
might be objected that any argument disputing the applicability of section 351 which grows
out of an analysis of the effect of tax-pooling suffers from circularity. Thus, Is It not Illogi-
cal to assert that the conditions present after a favorable application of the section has been
assumed may in turn be thought to cast doubt upon the section's initial applicability?
The answer would seem to be that the temporary nature of share ownership in exchange
funds is the consequence, not of the application of section 351, but of the act of combining
separately-owned assets which are unequal in net value to begin with. Inequality Is present
because the properties combined have appreciated in different degrees while in the hands
of the individual investors, and the potential tax liability per X dollars of property there-
fore varies from person to person. In these circumstances the investors might choose to
reflect their differing equities by adjustments to the exchange value of their respective
contributions; or they might be indifferent to the disparities among them. In either case
the factor of differing equities would cease to play a part in the investor's decision to
stay with or withdraw from the pool as time passed. But, the exchange fund Investors
are neither indifferent to net value disparities, nor do they wish to reflect those dispari-
ties by adjusting exchange values. The apparent conflict in aims is resolved by enabling
each investor to withdraw from the fund at such time as his own tax liability has been
relieved or he elects to reassume that liability individually, that is, by the issuance of
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in a conventional fund redeems on the basis of his investment judg-
ment and is not compelled to do so by what may be called the tax
economics of the arrangement. Moreover, the obligation of the ex-
change fund to redeem its shares is not merely an equally acceptable
substitute for the sale of such shares to outsiders; rather, redeemability
is specifically designed to preserve investor net worth even though
the long-range consequence is the destruction of the fund. In the case
of conventional funds, there is at least a possibility that the public
would offer as much as or more than net asset value if the shares were
non-redeemable. In addition, for conventional funds, the function of
the redemption privilege, in part, is to support or justify the continuous
offering of new shares to the public79 Redeemability is thus expected
to promote the growth, not the decline, of the conventional fund's
investment capacity.
CONCLUSION
There is occasionally a tendency to downgrade the significance of
tax-postponement on the ground that the question is merely one of
"tax now or tax later." But the scope of the non-recognition provisions,
as has been said elsewhere and often,80 is important under our tax
system for three reasons. First, a gain that is not recognized when an
exchange takes place may never be recognized by virtue of the adjust-
ment in basis that occurs at the taxpayer's death. Even though it is
true that technical questions relating to the application of particular
Code sections cannot properly be resolved by reference to the ultimate
irrationality of the death-basis rule, nevertheless the existence of a
provision which forgives tax at death gives a special urgency to the
shares redeemable at the holder's option. The prospect of a stepped-up basis at death
similarly gives rise to a need for a redemption privilege.
Section 351 does not create the differences in investors' equities. Nor does it create the
conditions under which a pooling of securities which have appreciated in varying degrees
will be acceptable to the investors. It seems incorrect, therefore, to say that section 351,
being first assumed to apply, then in effect produces the circumstances necessary to a fiid-
ing of "temporariness." Rather, the question is whether an arrangement which must be
placed upon a temporary footing in order to satisfy investors' objectives nevertheless
succeeds in meeting the requirements of the section.
The matter is admittedly dearer if the pooling can be viewed as separate from the
section 351 issue. Where gain and liability are related, the consequence may simply be
that the effort to satisfy the section is self-defeating.
79. See Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 37 U. Dir. L.J. 369, 288 (1960); SEC Report of Special Studies
of Securities Markets, Part 4, p. 97, H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
80. See A.L.I., INcoME TAX PROBL.nIS OF COR'ORAnONS AND StLARtoLD.RS 267 (1958);
Hellerstein, supra note 8.
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question whether or not a particular exchange qualifies for tax-free
treatment. Second, the present postponement of tax affords the tax-
payer an opportunity (not available to others making taxable ex-
changes) to select the point at which a final recognition of gain will
produce the most favorable tax result. He may wait for a rate reduc-
tion if, as at the present, there is some reason to expect one, or he may
delay recognition until there has been a realization of offsetting capital
losses. Finally, and most important, the tax law contains no general
exemption for non-cash exchanges. And whatever may be said for
the familiar proposal to postpone tax on sales of appreciated securities
if the proceeds are reinvested in other securities,"' such a privilege is
not now available to the investing public in general and is essentially
contrary to the present basic policy of the Code. Although the Code
contains important exceptions to that policy, as in the like-kind ex-
change and reorganization areas, those exceptions are still relatively
narrow and specific. Certainly they cannot be cited as justifying the
accidental introduction of a major tax-postponement device, especially
one whose use is, as a practical matter, restricted to wealthy investors.
The development of the capital exchange fund as a device for the
avoidance of federal tax on dispositions of appreciated securities is a
tax-planning achievement of more than ordinary impact. Although the
oldest of the exchange funds-the renowned Centennial Fund, formed
with assets of less than $27 million-has been in existence for only
five years, investor response to the basic conception of the exchange
fund has been so enthusiastic that the number of such funds now
stands at eighteen. 2 The value of initial assets was in excess of $700
million at the end of 1964 and may have reached $1 billion at the
present writing. This proliferation is the more striking for having
taken place in the face of two discouraging influences: the first, but
least serious, has been the inability of the exchange funds to obtain
formal approval of the tax status of fund formations from the Internal
Revenue Service; the second is the unfavorable, or at best wary, re-
action of some investment analysts to the performance record of the
exchange funds as investment media. Notwithstanding, those fund
management organizations which are most active in the field have
succeeded in producing new and sizable funds on a nearly annual basis
for the last few years; and since additional funds presumably are even
now in the formative stage it is evident that the outlook for the ex-
change fund industry, at least from the standpoint of the fund pro-
moters, is distinctly bullish. No one, however, has yet suggested that
81. See SMITH, FEDERAL TAX REFOM 119 (1961).
82. ARTHUR WIESENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 68, at 96 and 272 (1965).
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exchange fund formations have a legitimate claim in policy to tax-free
treatment, and if a reasonable argument can be made for disqualifica-
tion under section 351, they ought, in a "wise administration of the
revenue system,"' 3 to be opposed.
The principal purpose of the exchange funds is to mutualize investor
risks without precipitating the recognition of taxable gain. Of course,
any corporate formation which involves the contribution of diverse
properties by two or more persons produces a distribution of risk
among the contributors, and there is no doubt that section 351 con-
templates such a result when it permits a tax-free pooling of separately-
owned assets. What the section should not be supposed to contemplate,
on the other hand, is an arrangement geared to the satisfaction of
individual tax-postponement needs through the redistribution of
corporate property to the shareholders at their request. Analysis sug-
gests that redistribution is integral to the exchange fund arrangement
and that the funds could not, consistent with their role as a tax-suspen-
sion device, be organized on the basis of either a permament capital
structure or one capable of expansion.
This flaw-though it is more than that-could provide a technical
basis for an attack on the tax-free status of exchange fund formations,
if the Service now resolved to make one. Such a resolve, on the other
hand, coming after a fairly lengthy period of apparent acquiescence
by the Service, would appear to raise some question of fairness if
applied to completed transactions. And although no taxpayer could
legitimately claim to have relied entirely on the Service's failure to
assert deficiencies in other instances, it would be understandable if the
Service, having at long last arrived at the position that fund formations
are indeed taxable, should nevertheless choose to express that position
in terms of a prospective application only.
8 4
83. See Caplin, supra note 11, at 16.
84. A determination that exchange fund formations are taxable would presumably
result in a windfall for those funds which were formed in a year now barred by the
statute of limitations, unless at the time such funds were formed the Service extracted
agreements that they would not subsequently claim a basis for the securities originally
received higher than the individual transferors' bases. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314, which mitigate
the effect of the statute of limitations in some circumstances, although applicable to the
individual shareholders, would not apply to the corporate transferee. See Regs. § 1.1312-
7(c), Example (1). Conceivably, on the other hand, since capital gains realized by a regu-
lated investment company are in effect passed through to the shareholders. some ground
might be found by the Service for the assertion of an estoppel--especially since the exist-
fug shareholder group includes no one not included in the original transferor group. See
generally, Mfintz and Plumb, Taxing Income in Years Not Realized under Doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel, 1954 So. CAUF. TAx INsr. 481 (1954). In cases in which the year of
exchange is still open, no doubt the problem could be handled through dosing agree-
ments. I.R.C. § 7121.
